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IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR GROWTH? THEORY ANDEVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
Is inequality harmful for growth? Wesujgest that it is.
To summarize our main argument: in a society wheredistributional
conflict is more important, political decisionsare more likely
to produce economic policies that allowprivate individuals to
appropriate less of the returns to growth promotingactivities,
such as accumulation of capital and productiveknowledge. In the
paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally
captures this idea. The model has a politico-economic
equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates
depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and
initial conditions. We then confront the testableempirical
implications with two sets of data. A first data setpools
historical evidence-which goes back to the mid 19thcentury-from
the US and eight European countries. A second dataset contains
post—war evidence from a broad cross—section of developed and
less developed countries. In both samples we finda
statistically significant and quantitatively important negative
relation between inequality and growth. Aftera comprehensive
sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not
distorted by measurement error, reverse causation,
hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems.
Torsten Persson Guido Tabellirij.
Institute for International Department of Economics Economic Studies University of California S—106 91 Stockholm, SWEDEN at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 900241
1. Introduction
Why do different countries—or the same country in different periods—grow at such
different rates? And what is the role of income distribution in thegrowth process? To
answer these old questions, we belive one should explain whygrowth—promoting policies
are or are not adopted. In this paper we try to do just that by combininginsights from
two recent strands of literature, namely the theory of endogenousgrowth and the theory of
endogenous policy. We can summarize our tentative conclusion in a simpleaphorism:
inequality is harmful for growth.
The arguments that lead us to this aphorism run as follows. Economicgrowth is
largely determined by the accumulation of knowledge usable in production. The incentives
for such productive accumulation hinge on the ability of individualsto privately
appropriate the fruits of their efforts, which in turn crucially hinges on what taxpolicies
and regulatory policies are adopted. In a society where distributional conflictis more
important, political decisions are likely to result in policies that allow lessprivate
appropriation and therefore less accumulation and less growth. But the growth rate also
depends on political institutions, for it is through the politicalprocess that conflicting
interests ultimately are aggregated into public policy decisions.
In the paper we first formulate a simple general equilibrium model thatformally
captures this idea. It is an overlapping generations model in which heterogeneous
individuals are born in every period and act as economicagents and voters. The model's
politico—economic equilibrium determines a sequence of growth ratesas a function of
parameters and initial conditions. We believe that the model is quite interesting in itself.
However, we spend relatively little time pondering over theoretical issues.Instead, we
spell out the model's empirical implications and confront them with two sets of data. The
first sample contains historical evidence from anarrow cross—section of nine currently
developed countries, the US and eight European countries. The second sample contains2
current evidence from a broad cross—section of countries, both developed and less
developed. The predictions of the model hold up in both samples. In particular, astrong
negative relation between income inequality at the start of the period and growth in the
subsequent period is present in both samples. We do not find as strong evidence for the
predictions concerning political institutions. Adequate data either are not readily available
or do not exhibit sufficient variation.
As we already mentioned, our work in this paper is related to both the theory of
endogenous growth and the theory of endogenous policy. The work on endogenous growth
has made clear the importance of policy for growth. But it has not yet made the link
between distribution, politics and policy.' Analogously, the literature onendogenous
policy has made clear the importance of distribution for policy. But it has not yet made
the link between policy and growth.2
Obviously, our work is also related to the vast literature in economic history and in
economic development about the relation between development and income distribution.
This work, which is both theoretical and empirical, largely revolves around the so called
Kuznets curve:thehypothesis that income inequality first increases and then decreases with
development.3 The Kuznets curve remains a controversial concept both theoretically and
Romer (1989a) surveys the literature on endogenous growth. Barro and Sala i Martin (1990)and
Rebelo (1990) discuss the growth consequences of alternative (exogenous) policies. Romer (1990)spells
out the income distribution consequences of trade policies in an endogenous growth model of a small
open economy and discusses informally how thesedistributionconsequences may block
growth—promoting policies from being pursued. Terrones (1990) models redistributive policy and growth
endogenously, but in a representative—agent model that does not address issues of distribution and
politics. Bertola (1990) studies the relationship between growth and the functional, rather than the size,
distributionof income, but he also does not model how distribution interacts with policy formation.
2 Perseon and Tabellinj (1990a) survey the literature on endogenous policy. The classicpapers on
how income distribution affects the choice of tax policy in a statcic voting modelare Meltzer and
Richards (1981), Roberts (1977) and Romer (1975). Independently of thispaper, Alesina and Rodrik
(1990) and Perottj (1990) have also studied the determination of tax policy in the political equilibrium of
an endogenous growth model.
As suggested by the name, the hypothesis is intimately associated with the writings of Simon
Kusnets, notably Kusnets (1966). Lindert and Williamson (1985) provide a recent evaluation of the
theoretical as well as the empirical work on the Kusnetscurve, while Bourguignon and Morrison (1990)
provide new cross country evidence on the effects of economic development on income distribution.3
empirically.But the work on the Kuznets curve deals with the question of how the level of
income affects income distribution, while our work instead addresses thequestion of how
income distribution affects the change in income. Our theory, as well asour empirical
tests, remain valid both in the presence and in the absence of a Kuznets curve.
In Section 2 of the paper we formulate our theoretical model of politico—economic
equilibrium growth. We use the model to derive an equilibrium sequence of growthrates,
and spell out its empirical implications. In Section 3 we describe our first dataset with
historical evidence from a narrow cross—section of countries andpresent results of
regressions for per capita growth rates on variables suggested by our theory. Section 4
presents our empirical work based on the second data set with post—war evidence from a
broad cross—section of countries. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the results and
with suggestions for further work. An Appendix contains some algebra, precise definitions
of our variables and details on our data sources.
2. Theory
2.1 The Model
We study an overlapping generations model with constant population, where individuals
live for two periods.4 Every individual has the same preferences. Let the utility of the th
individual born in period t —1,but indexed by t, be:
(2.1) vU(c1, d).
In (2.1) c denotes the consumption when young and d the consumption when old. The
utility functionU(.)is concave, well—behaved and homothc'tic or—without loss of
4 Themodel is a close relative of that in Perssori and Tabellini (1990b).Theoverlapping
generations structure enables us to disregard the effect of individua] savgs decisions on the whealth
distribution of future generations, which considerably simplifies the analysis.4
generality—--Iinearly homogeneous.
Different individuals have different incomes. The budget constraint3 ofthe 2th
individual are;




where y is the 1th individual's income when young (to be definedbelow), k and k are
the individual and average accumulation, respectively, of anasset, r is the exogenous rate
of return on that asset, and 0 is a policy variable (throughout thepaper we use
superscripts to denote individual—specific variables and no superscripts to denoteaverage
variables). Thus in this model policy is purely redistributive: it takes from those who have
invested more than the average and gives to those who have invested less than theaverage.
The income when young is defined as:
(2.3) =(wi+
where w is an exogenous average endowment of "basic skills" and e2an exogenous
individual-specific endowment of such skills. Thus the stock of k accumulatedon average
by the previous generation has a positive externality on the income of the newborn
generation. The most straightforward interpretation of this externality is to think of k
as physical or human capital, that has a "knowledge spillover" on the basic skills of the
young—as in Arrow (1962) or Romer (1986). But it may be more relevant to think of k
as a measure of knowledge that is useful in promoting technicalprogress. In this case, the
owners of k earn monopoly rents from their previous investment in the accumulation of
knowledge. The policy variable 0 would then represent regulatory policy suchas "patent
legislation" or "protection of property rights", so that U becomes an index of howwell an
individual can privately appropriate the returns on his investment. Asa practical matter,
of course, technical progress is largely embodied innew capital, so the two interpretations5
need not be mutually exclusive.5
Throughout the paper we assume thatetalways has a zero mean and a
non—positive median, but it is distributed according to a family of distribution functions
Fe2,k)onthe interval (e, ,k). Differentlevels of kinducemean preserving spreads on
some primitive distribution function.Thus, even though the model does not derive
endogenously a law of motion of income distribution, it may nevertheless be consistent
with the dynamics of the Kuznets curve. In particular, as will be seen below, different
hypotheses about the function F(e', k) have important implications for the equilibrium
dynamics of growth.
Events unfold according to the following timing. At the start of period t—1 the
eligible voters choose Then investors choose k1. Thus, we abstract from credibility
problems and just assume that there is one period—ahead commitment of policy. Since the
old generation in period t—l is not affected by the policy enacted in periodt, we assume
5 it is possible to show that the second interpretation is formally consistent with our mode!.




Here is the range of intermediate goods available in period t and the function g()is twice
continuosly differentiable, strictly concave for z < z ,g(0)=0and g(z)= r +wrforz > z, where r
and warcpositive and tirne—dependent parameters. Suppose that to produce the quantity z(j) of
good j one unit of previously accumulated "capital" k and z(j) units of labor are required. Then,
one unit of k may be interpreted as necessary "know—how" or technology, which once acquired makes it
possible to produce a specific good j using labor according to a linear production function. Clearly,
the higher the per—capita investment in k in period t —1,the more "know—how" the economy
posesses in period t. Suppose further that the existing legislation enables the owners of "know—how" to
appropriate a fraction (1—0) of the monopoly rents from their investment in knowledge acquisition,
while the remaining fraction 0 is an externality that benefits all the owners of the prodution technology.




Suppose finally that labor is paid its marginal product and is supplied inelastically by young individuals
in the quantity 1 +for a young of type i and that we normalize aggregate labor supply at per
capita labor supply, so that z =1.In this set—up, we obtain precisely the budget constraints (2.2).6
without loss of generality that only the young generation participates in the vote.
A politico—economic equilibrium is defined as a policy and a set of private economic
decisions such that: (i) The economic decisions of all citizens are optimal, given policy,
and markets clear; (ii) The policy cannot be defeated by any alternative in a majority
vote among the citizens in the enfranchised section of the population. (Below we analyze
the effects of constitutional limits on political participation).
2.2 Economic Equilibrium
With homothetic preferences, the ratio of consumption in the two periods is a function only
of intertemporal prices and is independent of wealth: that is, for all id/c1=D(rt,
withDr> 0 and<0.Equivalently, every individual has the same "savings rate" so
that individuals with more skills accumulate more k. Using this fact and the budget
constraints (2.2), we can write the amounts consumed by the 1th individual as:
(2.4) c21 =rtD(rt, Ot)[(1_Ot)y + Utkt]/[D(rt,+ rt(l_O)J
(2.5) d =rt[(1_Ot)yi+ Otkt}/[.D(rt,°) +rt(l_Ot)).
For the average individual, kt = — c1.By repeated substitution and use of (2.2)
and (2.3) we can therefore solve for the per capita growth rate of k, that we label
(2.6) =G(w1,O) =kt/kt
—1=wti.D(rt, O)/(r + D(rt,°)
— 1.
In (2.6) G> 0, Gr0,and <0(since D0 <0).Thus, the higher are the
average skills w, the higher is the growth rate of k. A higher gross rate of return may
increase or decrease growth, depending on the usual balancing of substitution and income
effects. But the more an individual can appropriate the fruits of his investment, the
higher is the growth rate (on average a change in 0 has only a substitution effect, since
the average individual receives a lump sum transfer equal to the tax he pays).
Note that the economic model is recursive: given an initial condition for k and a
sequence {0,w, rt} of policies and parameters, we can solve for a sequence of growth7
rates.6Note also that GDP in period tis given by (w + rt)k. In the empirical
sections to follow we will clearly want to allow for time dependence in bothand rt.
But in the remainder of the theoretical discussion, we will adopt the simplifying
assumption that == wand =r=rfor all t. In that case is the
common growth rate of k, GDP and consumption.
2.3 Political Eciuilibrium
To characterize the political equilibrium we first study the2thindividual's policy
preferences. Consider his indirect utility function over the policy variable 0Since
preferences are linearly homogeneous, we know that U(c1, d) =c1U(1, D(r,
Usingthis property together with (2.3) —(2.6)we can write his indirect utility as
(2.7) =V(r,0)[W(w, r, °) + eiJki,
whereV(r, [1 + D(r, O)/r(10)['U(l, D(r, andW(w, r,
tt{1+ OtO(r,Ot)/(1 —Ot)(r+ .0(r, °))l Below we exploit the facts that V0 < 0 (the
indirect utility function is decreasing in the relative price of future goods, given wealth),
W0 > 0(if we use a Laffer—curve type assumption), W,W/w > 0,and
W0= W0/w>0.
Since the preferences in (2.7) are linear in the individual—specific variable e2, they
belong to the class of intermediate preferences studied by Grandmont (1978). Provided
that v has a unique maximum in we therefore obtain a median—voter result: the
equilibrium policy is the value of 0 preferred by the median voter. Let e1 denote the
individual endowment of whoever happens to be the median voter in period t—1. The
equilibrium policy 0 is then implicitly defined by the first—order condition
(2.8) V0(W+ e11) + VW0 =0.
6 Forthis reason we need not specify a law of motion for the exogenous parameters w and r,in
order to Bolve for the equilibrium at any point in time. Naturally, however, the equilibrium dynamics
will depend on these law of motions.8
This condition reflects the trade off facing the voters. On the one hand, an increase in C
redistributes income and welfare from individuals with positive e2 and thus with k> k
to individuals with negative e and k < k. On the other hand, an increase in U is costly
in that it diminishes investment and therefore the base for redistribution.If the
second—order condition is satisfied, (2.8) implicitly defines the equilibrium policy as a
function: O(w, r, e_1). Given the signs of the partials that we noted below (2.7), it is
easy to verify that U 0 as e_1 o 0 < 0, 0, 0 as e_1 0, and 0 0.
Intuitively, if the median voter coincides with the average investor (e'_1 =0),he prefers
a non—redistributive policy (°= 0),whereas he prefers a tax (a subsidy) on investment if
he is poorer (richer) than the average. More generally, a median voter with higher
individual skills em and therefore a higher km prefers more private appropriability (a
lower 6). A higher average skill level w gives higher average accumulation and hence
increases the cost of redistribution, so that the voter prefers a less interventionist policy (a
lower tax or a smaller subsidy). And a higher rate of return r may both increase and
decrease the preferred level of 0.
We are interested in analyzing political institutions that potentially limit the
franchise to a segment of the population. We shall introduce such constitutional limits in
our model in a very simple way: only those individuals in generation t —1who have
basic skills (and therefore income) within some bounded interval are allowed to vote on
Denote the upper and lower bounds on the franchise by and_i Then, the




Clearly, E, E > 0, since shifting either of the bounds upwards raises the median. But
who is the median voter also depends on overall inequality, as manifested in the shape of F,
which in turn, shifts with k. Thus, the sign of Ek is ambiguous and depends on whether9
em 0 as well as on how F(.) changes with k. For example, if a higher k leads tomore
inequality (Fk> 0) and the old median is poorer than average (em < 0), then the new
median becomes even poorer (Ek < 0).
This approach allows us to parameterize many different political Constitutions in a
simple way. Suppose that only the lower boundis a binding constraint on electoral
participation (because '<). Then the model is broadly consistent with that, period in
the political history of virtually all Western democracies when only individuals with a
minimum amount of human or financial capital were eligible to vote. Conversely, suppose
that < e and only the upper boundconstitutes a binding constraint. Then the model
captures some aspects of a socialist regime in which wealthy individuals have no political
influence.Alternatively, in a democratic regime, the upper boundcould reflect
constraints on campaign contributions that limit the political influence of wealthy
individuals. More generally, what matters is not only how democratic a regime is, but also
how it allocates political rights and political influence between wealthy and poor citizens.
Combining (2.8) and (2.9), we obtain that the equilibrium policy can be expressed
as the function
(2.10) =O*(w,r,i—i' —i' h—i))-
And the growth rate in politico—economic equilibrium is given by (2.6) and (2.10):
(2.11) =G(w,r, O(w, r, Ekti, —i, t—)))-
We can now derive some comparative statics results:
(2.12a) dgt/dcti =GOOeE> o, = or
(2.12b) dg/dw =+G0O > 0 if E < 0
(2.12c) dg/dk_1 =GOOeEk0 as Ek0.
(2.12d) dg/dr =Gr+ GOOr > 0,
where the signs follow from the discussion above. Thus, extending the franchise to
wealthier citizens, or restricting the participation of the poorest, increases equilibrium
growth. The same is true for a permanent increase in average basic skills (if the median10
voter is not too much richer than the average citizen the result holds unambigously, but if
he is much richer the result may reverse depending on functional forms). But changes in
the stock of technically useful knowledge (capital) can produce either higher or lower
growth depending on what happens to overall inequality. Changes in the rate of return
have an ambigous effect on the growth rate
2.4 Dynamics of Growth
The model allows for very different growth patterns. But since the model is recursive, the
growth history of a given country is completely determined by the initial condition k0, by
the properties of F(e, k), and by the history forand(and for w and ,-).Itis
relatively straightforward to characterize the qualitative dynamics of the model.
It is clear that the growth pattern crucially depends on how F(.) shifts with k.
Thisquestion is not easy. In fact, it is the very question that the literature on the Kuznets
curve, which we cited in the Introduction, is all about. How the distribution of skills and
income evolves, clearly depends on many details of the development process such as the
time patterns of sectoral change, education and urbanization. Suppose though, for the sake
of the argument, that the hypothesis underlying the Kuznets curve is valid, so that
inequality increases with development at low levels of income, but decreases at higher
levels of income. Translated into the model, this would mean that—as long as Ewere
negative and we held (,) constantat some level—E would be decreasing up to some
point kandthen increasing. If k0isbelow k,thenby (2.12) the time path of the
growth rate is non—monotonic:first falls until k_i reaches kandthen accelerates
again at higher level of development.
This non—monotonicity implies that the equilibrium dynamics can exhibit path
dependence. Figure 2.1 illustrates the point. Consider a country with relatively high
income inequality, and with a correspondingly low equilibrium growth path; suppose that
this path is so low that it intersects the horizontal axis, as in Figure 2.1. If the economyFigure 2.111
initially finds itself to the left of point k,itis in a "growth trap", where income inequality
is or becomes so pronounced that it discourages further accumulation and growth. In the
growth trap, the only way the economy could take off again would be if the equilibrium
growth path somehow was shifted upwards, so that it did not intersect the horizontal axis.
The model also suggests alternative ways in which growth could take off from a
situation such as the one in Figure 2.1.One way could be through a policy of
"depauperization", which reallocates property rights and redistributes wealth to the poor.
By creating a political consensus for more private appropriation, this policy would foster
growth. Another way could be through a policy of massive subsidization of primary and
secondary education would at the same time increase the average skill level and reduce
inequality,therebyshiftingtheequilibriumgrowthpathupwards.
Interestingly—according to observers such as Adelman (1978)—several of the countries
that we now regard as successful (such as Korea, Taiwan, and Israel), engaged precisly in
such redistributive and educational policies just before their growth take off in the early
1960g. Naturally, the question remains what events made these policy reversals politically
feasible.
But widespread redistribution and education are not the only ways to fight a growth
trap, according to the model. Another way is to restrict the political participation of the
poor. Such restrictions were common in the political history of the Western democracies,
where the franchise—and political participation in general—was originally restricted to
the wealthiest individuals and only gradually extended to the entire population. A stiffer
limit on political participation would prevent the distributional conflict from manifesting
itself in policies that limit the incentives for accumulation, and could thus keep up growth
even in the presence of acute inequality. A country could thus descend along the
downward sloping part of the curve in Figure 2.1 without getting stuck in a growth trap.
As development progresses and inequality is reduced, political rights could be extended to
larger fractions of society without endangering growth.12
These suggestions about alternative ways of avoiding a growth trap raise some
important normative questions about intergenerational and intragenerational equity, as
well as some difficult positive questions about the durability and sustainability of political
institutions. But to analyze these questions, we would have to extend the model, so as to
endogenize what is presently taken as exogenous. We discuss the necessary extensions in
the concluding section, but they are clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5 EmDirical imulications
Our theory has some clear—cut and testable ceterisparibuspredictions for a given country,
namely:
(1)A more equal distribution of basic skills—a decreasing mean preserving spread on
Fet, k)— increasesgrowth.
(2)A higher average level of basic skills—a higher w— increases growth.
(3)Less political participation of the poor—a higher c—or more political participation
by the rich—a higher —increasesgrowth.
The predictions regarding the effects on growth of the rate of return rareinconclusive.
However, that may not be such a loss, since r in the model measures the gross (pre—tax or
inclusive—of—externalities) return on accumulating productive knowledge, a variable that is
notoriously difficult to observe empirically.
When going from the model to our empirical tests, we want to relax the simplifying
assumption that wandrareconstant over time. Doing that breaks the one—to—one link
between the growth rate in k and the growth rate in GDP, which is what we ultimately
observe. We make the following assumptions about the processes for wandr
(2.13a) log w =logw1 + +
(2.13b) log r =logr+
where g is the growth rate of GDP and where, iandiarewhite—noise error terms.
We also want to allow for variations in the income distribution function F(eZ, k) across13
countries and time. We thus assume that the idiosyncratic income component e1is
distributed in the population according to the function F(et, ktl, where .A is a
parameter that captures factors (other than the level of development) which affect the
distribution of income. As with k, we will think of changes in \ as inducing mean
preserving spreads on F(.). Given these assumptions, we demonstrate in the Appendix
how one can use the model to derive the following first—order approximation of
(2.14) t =a+ cxv' w1 + cxE (E + Ekkt_l + Eei) + 17t.
In (2.14) the constant a captures the average effect on growth of the (unobservable) rate
of return and the error term ij captures the effects on growth of country—specific and
time—specific variations in the (unobservable) level of i' and the growth rate of w.
Thecoefficients aW and crE are both positive.
The model is formulated in terms of per capita growth and abstracts from
population growth and from short—run fluctuations. Given that the time unit of the model
is a generation, equation (2.14) is relevant only for growth rates over relatively long periods
of time. Further, it is relevant only in a given country with particular economic and
political institutions.
Because usable data on relevant variables never goes back further than to the mid
19th century, we cannot realistically hope to test theseimplications on data from a single
country. But we can try to combine the historical evidence of countries with a similar
economic and political history. This is in fact the approach that we follow in Section 3,
where we pool historical data from a narrow cross—section of nine currently developed
countries. In Section 4, we take a bolder approach in looking at post—war data from a
broad cross—section of countries, developed as well as developing. There we need to assume
that the vast institutional differences between countries do not swamp the relations
between growth and other variables that our model suggests.14
3. Historical Evidence
3.1 Data
Our historical data set covers nine countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the UK, and the US. We divide the time period
back to 1830 into subperiods of 20 years each, so that the first possible observation for each
country comprises the years 1830—50 and the last observation comprises the years 1970—85
(the last observation is the only one that has 15 years rather than 20). For each country
and variable, we go as far back as the data permits. Our data base is put together from a
variety of sources, which are detailed in the Appendix. But the most important sources are
Maddison (1982), Flora (1983), Flora, Kraus and Pfennig (1987), and Summers and Heston
(1988).
Per Capita Growth. The dependent variable in all our regressions is the annual
average growth rate of GDP per capita (continuously compounded and expressed as a
percentage) for each country and each 20 year episode. We have a total of 57 observations
for this variable, which we call RTGROWTH. The mean value in the sample is 1.88,
and the range goes from 0.17 (Austria 1910—30) to 5.05 (Germany 1950—70) Summary
statistics for this and for all other variables appear in Table 3.1.
For the independent variables, we try to find data that match our model as closely
as possible. In each case, we also follow the model in trying to find an observation as close
to the beginning of the time period as possible. Unless otherwise noted, the explanatory
variables described below are measured at the start of each of the 20 years periods.
DistriblLtion. In our model the terms and Ekk reflect the effect of the shape
of the basic skills (and first—period income) distribution on the identity of the median
voter. It is hard to find an exact empirical counterpart, but the best available distribution
data for our purposes are based on personal income before tax. The basic variable we use
in our regressions, INCSH, is the share in personal income of the top 20% of theTable 3.1: Summary statistics for historical sample
# OBS MEAN STD. DEV MIN MAX
RTGROWTH 57 1.875 1.026 0.17 5.05
GDP 57 3005 2132 752 9459
INCSH 38 0.504 0.068 0.38 0.67
SCHOOL 52 0.140 0.081 0.017 0.362
NOFRAN 59 0.278 0.312 —0.01 0.89
CORRELA TION MATRIX
RTCROWTH CDP INCSH SCHOOL
GDP 0.280
INCSH —0.472 —0.717
SCHOOL 0.401 0.889 —0.622
NOFRAN —0.364 —0.580 0.754 —0.62015
population.7 We have 38 observations for this variable. The mean value is 0.50 ,andthe
observations range from 0.38 (Sweden in 1970) to 0.67 (Finland in 1930).
Political participation. In our model, Ef reflects the effect of a limited franchise
on the identity of the median voter. The closest empirical counterpart we can think of is
the share of the enfranchised age and sex group in the population that is not in the
electorate. This measure corrects for political discrimination of women and for different
age limits for voting across countries, factors that do not seem directly relevant in our
context.8 For this variable, NOFRAN, we have 59 observations, with a mean of 0.28
and a range from 0 (virtually all countries in the post—war period) to 0.89 (the UK in
1830 and the Netherlands in 1850 and 1870).
Average skills. In our model, w measures the average basic skills of the young
generation. The empirical counterpart of this variable clearly has to do with the general
education leve1. To correct for any possible differences in the classification of schools
across countries and to take the quality of education into account, we constructed an index
of schooling. For each country and time period, we looked at how large a share of the
relevant age group was enrolled in primary school, lower secondary school, higher
secondary school and tertiary school, respectively, at the start of each period. Our index,
SCHOOL, weighs these numbers together with weights that are increasing in the level of
schooling. We have 52 observations for the index. Its mean is 0.14 and it ranges from
0.017 (England in 1850) to 0.362 (Finland in 1970).
7 More comprehensive measures of inequality such as Gini—coefficients would preferable. But we
think that INCSH is an inequality measure of about the same quality (whatever the absolute quality
is).In fact, for the 27 observations where we have overlap, the correlation coefficient between the
Gini—coeffient and INCSH is close to 0.8.
8 A wider measure of political participation, which is also available, is the number of votes in
general elections as a share of the population above age 20.
9 According to the model, the average skills variable wmeasuresthe flowofnew human capital
associated with each new generation. Our observable counterpart, the percentage of the population
enrolled at the start of the period, is also a flow measure of human capital, and in this respect
corresponds well to the model.16
The level of development. Our model has the strong implication that the growth
rate is not systematically related to the level of development. Put differently, the model
does not predict any convergence, so that poor countries grow faster than rich countries,
once we control for other factors. However, this implication is not likely to survive slight
variations in the theory. Moreover, the question of whether or not there is convergence,
once we control for other variables identified by our theory, is interesting in its own right.
For this reason, in some regressions we also include as an explanatory variable the level of
development, measured by the level of GDP per capita, which we label GDP. We also use
GDP when constructing fitted values to replace missing observations (see further below).
To get real GDP levels comparable across countries, we used Summers and Heston's (1988)
measures of GDP at international prices in 1950 and 1970. For earlier periods, we used the
1950 observations as a benchmark, and spliced them with the real GDP series for each
country. This procedure effectively assumes constant international relative prices for
earlier periods. Here too, we have 57 observations, which (expressed in 1980 international
$)rangefrom 752 (Sweden in 1870) to 9459 (The US in 1970).
For the variables we use as proxies above, we assume the following relationships
between the variables in our model and the variables we observe:
(3.la) =+SCHOOL +
(3.lb) Eti + Ekkt 1 =
—'
INCSHt 1 +
(3.ic) Eeti =+NOFRA Nt_i +
where (7S .,I 7N) are positive constants, (7W,Eyf)arepositive or negative
constants and (jf9,N) are iid measurement errors. In addition, our dependent
variable RTGROWTH, as well as GDP, may also be measured with error. In Section
3.2, we shall proceed under the assumption that the measurement errors are negligible, but
in Section 3.3 we explore whether the results are robust to measurement error. Plugging
(3.1) into (2.14) we get the basic equation to estimate
(3.2) =3+ i3'1'w_1+ j31 INCSHt + N NOFRANt_i +17
According to our theory,1)should be positive /31 should be negative and /3can
be either positive or negative.
3.2 Results
The first set of regressions for our historical sample, were all estimated by ordinary least
squares. Table 3.2 reports on parameter estimates and summary statistics. Columns
(1)—(6) in the table are based on the sample of 38 observations where we have observations
for all our variables. The results in columns (7)—(12) are based on a larger sample, where
we replaced missing values for INCSH (18 observations) and SCHOOL (3 observations)
by the fitted values obtained by regressions on the independent variables and GDP.'°
The most striking result in columns (1)—(6) is the effect of inequality on growth.
Not only are the coefficients on INCSH of the expected negative sign and almost always
statistically significant—despite the strong collinearity among the right—hand—side
variables. But they are also economically significant: an increase by 0.07—one standard
deviation in the sample—in the income share of the top 20% lowers the average annual
growth rate just below half a percentage point. Differences in distribution alone explain
about a fifth of the variance in growth rates across countries and time.
SCHOOL, our index for average skills, has the expected sign, but is never
statistically significant."
GDP, the level of per capita income at the start of the period, enters with a
negative sign, but is significant only at the 20% level.If we interpret the regression
results as a mere description of the data, rather than literally as a test of our theory, the
negative coefficient indicates some tendency for growth rates to converge, once we control
10 For INCSH the fitted values are INCSH =0.5698—0.4742SCH00L+ 0.1O27NOFRAN and
INCSH =0.5399—0.14E—O4CDP-F O.1412NOFRAN, and for SCHOOL they are SCHOOL =0.0552
+ 0.030E—O4GDP 0.O438NOFRAN.
It Running the regressions replacing the index with its separate components produces little
difference in the results.Table 3.2: Regressions for RTGROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









































2 0.159 0.183 0.154 0.176 0.183 0.162
SEE 1.016 1.001 1.018 1.006 1.001 1.014
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)









































B2 0.180 0.194 0.195 0.208 0.168 0.195
SEE 0.934 0.927 0.926 0.918 0.941 0.926
Note: Ordinary—leaat.—equares regressions)t—values in brackets.18
for other factors. 12
NOFRAN, our measure of political participation, is insignificant with the wrong
sign.'3 However, that may just reflect the lack of variation in this variable in a large part
of the sample: all observations for 1930 and later are close to zero for all countries. To
study the effect of a limited franchise, it is therefore preferable to look at the regressions in
columns (7)—(12), where we have an additional 18 observations from earlier periods. In
these equations the coefficient on NOFRAN indeed drops considerably to take on a value
around 0. We conjecture that if we had more observations from the 19th century, we
would indeed pick up a significant positive sign.14
For theother variables, the results are slightly different to those in the smaller
sample. The overall fit of the model now looks somewhat better. In particular, adding
GDP to the right—hand side adds basically nothing, and there is no indication of
convergence in growth rates in the larger sample that covers (On average) 40 extra years of
each country's history. Indeed, it is likely that the stronger negative coefficient on GDP
in the smaller sample largely reflects the effects of World War II. The three countries in
our sample on the losing side of that war—Austria, Finland and Germany—have the three
highest growth rates in 1950—70 (and in the sample)—4.62, 4.04 and 5.05—as well as the
three lowest GDP levels in 1950 of all the nine countries.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
12 This finding is similar to the results found by Barro (1991) and by Mankiw, Romer and Well
(1990) for post—war growth across a broad cross—section of countries.
13 We also tried to interact the measure of political participation with the income inequality
measure without much success.
14 If we run the regression equation (3.2) excluding all observations pertaining to the periods
1930—50, 1950—70, and 1970—85, we obtain (i—values in brackets):
RTGROWTH= 4.17 —5.48INCSH-F 0.31SCHOOL + 0.75NOFRAN.
(1.60) (—1.30) (0.24) (1.14)
But the overall fit of this equation is pretty bad: R2 =0.05.19
A relevant question, given that we are dealing with data that go back to the mid 19th
century, is how robust our results are to measurement error. In addressing this question,
we make the conventional assumption in the errors—in—variables literature, namely that
the measurement errors—the error terms in (3.2) and the measurement error in
GDP—are orthogonal to each other and to the unobserved true regressors. We follow the
approach of Kiepper and Learner (1984). We start by reestimating the coefficients in
column (5) of Table 3.2 by four "reverse regressions", where in each regression we replace
the independent variable RTGROWTH with one of the dependent variables INCSH,
NOFRAN, ScHOOL, and GDP. We thus obtain five estimates for each coefficient that
can be used as diagnostics. The results show that when we minimize in the direction of
INCSH and GDP, the coefficients on these two variables retain their signs from Table
3.2. But if we minimize in the direction of SCHOOL and NOFRAN these and other
coefficients change sign. Kiepper and Learner's results then imply that the sign of the
estimated coefficients are robust to error in our measure of inequality (INCSI-f) and GDP,
but not to measurement error in our measure of average skills (SCHOOL) and political
participation (NOFRAN).
If we assume that only inequality and GDP are measured with error, we can
compute consistent bounds on the true maximum likelihood estimates for the coefficients
on these variables: [—5.35, —86.2] for INCSH and [—O.27E—05, —O.21E—03] for GDP.
Note that the coefficient on INCSH in Table3.2coincides with the lower
maximum—likelihood bound (in absolute value) and the coefficient on GDP in Table 3.2
coincides with the upper bound (in absolute value). Thus, if anything, measurement errors
tend to bias the results against our theory.
Of the independent variables, income inequality and GDP are certainly those that
are most likely to be measured with error. The INCSH data is based on tax statistics in
each country. But different tax laws create problems for cross—country comparisons, both
because the income units and the income concepts may differ. Furthermore, there are20
problems with incomplete coverage, particularly in earlier years, imperfectly adjusted for
by census data. The GDP data in earlier periods are probably mismesured already in the
original national statistics. And to get GDP levels comparable across countries, we had
to make the unbelievable assumption of no relative price movements before 1950. '
Itis therefore reassuring that our results are robust to errors in these two variables.
But are we willing to assume that average skills and political participation are measured
correctly by SCHOOL and NOFRAN, respectively? In the case of NOFRAN we do not
feel too bad about it, since it is obtained from detailed census data and unambiguous
franchise requirements. But the assumption that the measurement error for SCHOOL is
negligible relative to that in INCSH and GDP is perhaps stronger.
Note, however, that the formal results above, allow for arbitrarily large
measurement errors. In particular, they assume that without measurement error the
regression equation would have anR2 of unity, and that the (squared) correlation
coefficient between each observed measure and its true unobservable counterpart is zero.
With less formidable prior assumptions about how serious the errors—in—variables problem
is, our results become more robust to measurement error and the consistentbounds for the
maximum—likelihood coefficients become tighter. For example, Theorem 6 in Klepper and
Leamer (1984) implies that the true maximum—likelihood coefficients have the same signs
as the coefficients in column (5) if the maximumR2 we would get, once all variables were
measured correctly, was less than 0.37. That is, if we are willing to attribute 63% of the
variance in RTGROWTH to measurement error in that variable or to any unobservable
omitted variable, such as the rate of return on the accumulation of knowledge (r in the
model), then we can be confident about the sign of the coefficients.
One may also ask if our results are distorted by simultaneity bias due to reverse
causation. In particular, would not a systematic relation between income inequality and
In his discussion about measurement error in cross—country regressions for growth, Rorner
(1989b) stresses measurement error in C 1)P.21
development—such as the Kuznets curve—give rise to a simultaneity problem? Let us
first note that direct reverse causation is ruled out, because INCSH is measured in the
beginning of each 20—year period, which makes it statistically predetermined relative to
RTGROWTH. But a systematic relation between inequality and development would make
our inequality measure correlated with lagged growth—indeed, our theoretical discussion
about growth dynamics in Section 2.4 relied precisely on such a relation.Such a
correlation does not cause any econometric problems a priori. However, if the residual of
the regression is serially correlated, then INCSH as well as GDP become correlated with
the error term, which could bias the estimated coefficients.
Let us explore this possibility in steps. First, is there a systematic relation between
lagged growth and inequality? To answer that question, we regress INCSH in country i
and in (the beginning of) period t on a constant and on RTGROWTH in country i and
period t—1. This yields (t—values in brackets):
INCSHti = 0.526 —
0.O15RTGROWTHt'i
(25.507) (—1.660)
with 72 =0.049.So there is indeed a marginally significant indication of negative effect
of lagged growth on inequality. But the effect is relatively weak: an increase in the growth
rate by one standard deviation causes a fall in next period inequality by a fifth of a
standard deviation.
Second, are the growth residuals serially correlated? To answer that question we
regress the growth residuals for country i and period t from the regression in column (1)
of Table 3.2 on a constant and on the residuals for country i and period t—1.' This
yields (t—values in brackets):
= 0.227 —
0.11117t'l.
18 We are thus investigating the possibility that the contemporaneous error term in the equation is
uncorrelated across countries, but that it has first—order aerial correlation with a common AR—i
coefficient across countries. It would be preferrable to consider a less restrictive error structure, but the
small number of observations for each country and time period make meaningful generalizations difficult.22
(1.381) (—0.729)
with=—0.019.Thus it seems unlikely that serial correlation is important. A formal
Lagrange—multiplier test for absence of serial correlation in the residuals is indecisive at
conventional significance levels.17
Further evidence is presented inTable 3.3. Columns (1)—(3) show regression
results when we add the lagged value of RTGROWTH (again country by Country) on the
right—hand--side of our earlier regressions.The coefficients on lagged growth are
insignificant, and the other coefficients take on roughly the same values as in Table 3.2,
which would be very unlikely if serial correlation was important. Finally, we also present
results from two—stage—least—-squares regressions, where the instruments are lagged values
of SCHOOL, GDP, and NOFRAN. The parameter estimates in columns (4)—{6) again
suggest that our results are not due to simultaneity bias.
The instrumental—variables estimates can also be taken as additional evidence on
the importance of measurement error.Evidently, the results strengthen our previous
conclusion that the estimates are robust to measurement error in INCSH and GDP.
Let us finally discuss the possible problem that there are omitted variables correlated
with the regressors. To ask that question we look at whether the residuals show a
particular pattern across countries or time. Consider first the variation across countries.
When we add a set of country dummies to the regression in colunm (7) of Table 3.2, the
coefficient on INCSH actually becomes even more negative (—10.50) and stays highly
significant (t—value —2.76), while the other coefficients remain insignificant. Also, the
country dummies add very little explanatory power (the SSE drops from 0.934 to 0.927).
Only the dummy for Finland, which is positive, is statistically significant. Here, there is
17 Thetest is based on regressing ion plusall the independent variables in the underlying
regression. The x2(1)—distributed test statistic is the number of observations times theR2 of the
regression. Its value is 4.725, which tells us to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation atthe
5% significance level, but not at the 2,5% level.Table 3.3: Regressions for RTGROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# OBS 35 35 35 35 35 35
CONSTANT 6.347 6.559 5.567 7.696 6.838 7.661
(4.039) (3.241) (3.401) (3.937) (0.936) (2.756)
INCSH —7.872 —8.266 —5.707 —11.651 —9.774 —10.946





RTGROW—1 —0.132 —0.107 —0.176
(—0.825) (—0.527) (—1.100)
B2 0.135 0.107 0.126 0.077 0.048 0.072
SEE 1.055 1.071 1.061 1.090 1.106 1.092
Note: Columns (1)—(3) ordinary—least—-squares regressions, columns (4)—(6) two—stage—-least-—squares
regressions, t—values in brackets.23
dearly no indication of a potential omitted—variable problem.
Consider next the variation across time. When we add a set of period dummies to
the same regression, all coefficients in the regression turn insignificant and the coefficient
on INCSH becomes positive.Furthermore, the time dummies add considerable
explanatory power (the SEE drops to 0.749). The dummy for 1950—70 is strongly
significant and positive and the dummy for 1970—85 is marginally significant and positive.
Thus, our regressions in Table 3.2 seem to predominantly pick up the time variation in
the data. Our model ascribes the higher average growth rates in the post—war period to a
more equal distribution of income. But naturally, it is possible that income inequality is
negatively correlated with some other growth—promoting variable, which is omitted in our
model and in our regressions. For instance, the second world war brought about a more
equal distribution of income as well as a set of important technological innovations. Our
finding that growth is higher in the 1950s than in the 1930s, and that income inequality is
lower in 1950 than in 1930, could thus simply reflect the effect of the war, rather than
being evidence of a causal nexus betweeen inequality and growth.'8
4. Current Evidence
4.1 Data
Our sample consists of 67 countries for which we could find reasonable data on income
distribution. Each observation corresponds to a country.
Per capita growth. Here, as in Section 3, our dependent variable is the annual
average growth rate of GDP per capita, which we call GROWTH. The time period
1Itwould have been desirable to investigate the cross—time and cross—country variation by
random—effects estimation. But meaningful random—effects estimation is difficult because the number of
countries and periods in our panel is small. On top of that data becomes available at different dates for
different contries, which makes the panel unbalanced.24
covered is 1960—85 and the source Summers and Heston (1988). For about half of the
countries, the data go back to 1950. In Section 4.3 we report on the results when
GROWTH is instead defined as the 1950—85 growth rate for those countries where data is
available, and the 1960—85 growth rate for the rest. Over the 1960—85 period the mean
value of GROWTH is 2.26 and it ranges from —2.83 (for Chad) to 7.45 (for
Singapore). Summary statistics for this variable, as well as the other variables in the data
set appear in Table 4.1
Distribution. Like in the historical data set, Gini—coefficients are available only for
a small number of countries. We use the measure of income inequality for which we have
the largest number of observations, namely the ratio of pre—tax income of the top 20% of
the population to that of the bottom 40%. This measure, which we call RATIO, is put
together from a variety of sources that we list in the Appendix. For about half the sample,
we also observe the income share of the top 20% separately, and its correlation with
RATIO is 0.9. The variable RATIO has a mean of 4.28, and it ranges from 1.60 (for
Japan) to 13.28 (for Ecuador).
There are at least two problems with this measure. First, it comes from different
sources and may thus be constructed on the basis of different criteria for different
countries. Its international comparability may thus be questioned. We deal with this
problem in the only way we can: we again do some sensitivity analysis of our results
against measurement errors. Second, and unlike in the historical data set, RATIO is
generally measured in the 70's, which is in the middle rather than at the beginning of the
period for which we measure the growth rates. Hence, there is a potential problem of
simultaneity bias. We deal with this problem by reestimating the model with instrumental
variables, where the instruments are measured at the beginning of the relevant time period.
Average 3kiUs. Like in the historical data set, we proxy this variable with different
measures of education. All observations are from 1960. In most regressions we use the
share (in percent) of the relevant age group attending primary school, PSCHOOL6O. ThisTable 4.1: Summary statistics for current sample
# OBS MEAN STD. DEV MIN MAX
GROWTH 67 2.256 1.918 —2.827 7.44
GDP6O 67 1988 1897 208 7380
RATIO 67 4.284 2.458 1.597 13.846
PSCHOOL6O 59 76.406 33.097 5 144
SSCHOOL6O 58 24.793 22.153 1 86
URB6O 63 39,889 26.300 4 100
IND6O 53 26.962 13.664 7 63
CORRELATION MATRIX
GROWTH GDP6O RATIO PSCHOOL6OSSCHOOL6O URBC5
GDP6O 0.101
RATIO —0.15 —0.287
PSCHOOL 0.534 0.684 —0.119
SSCHOOL 0.372 0.813 —0.406 0.732
URB65 0.404 0.728 —0.237 0.748 0.743
IND6O 0.149 0.520 —0.005 0.530 0.415 0.58025
measure is available for 59 countries. It has a mean of 16.3 and ranges from 5 (for
Niger) to 144 (for France). But we also used another variable, the share attending
secondary school, SSCHOOL6O, and experimented with a weighted education index
defined like in Section 3.
Political participation. Our theoretical model in Section 2 identifies the degree to
which different income (skill) groups participate in political decisions as a central
determinant of growth. Unfortunately, we have not been able to construct any empirical
counterpart in the larger sample of countries with its wide span of political institutions.
We have data on whether or not the regime is democratic. But according to the model this
is not necessarily a correct institutional variable. In the case of a non—democratic regime,
we need to now whether it is a dictatorship representing "right—wing" or "left—wing"
groups. Moreover, the nature of a regime may be endogenous and may, in particular,
depend on the past growth performance (see Londregan and Poole (1989)). Nevertheless,
the spirit of our model is to capture policymaking in a democracy. So what we do below is
to first run our regressions for the whole cross—section. Then we run them separately for
the subsamples of democratic and non-democratic regimes to see if the nature of the
regime makes a difference.
Other variables.This sample consist of countries which not only differ in their
political institutions, but also in their economic structure and in their cultural traditions.
In light of this, we don't want to take the theoretical model in Section 2 too literally in
providing an exact empirical specification. To try and control for institutional differences
that may explain cross—country differences in growth, we include alternative combinations
of the following variables: (i) the level of GDP per capita in 1960, GDP6O; (ii) the
percentage of the population that lived in urban areas in the year 1965, URB65; and (iii)
the percent of national income originating in the industrial sector in 1960, IND6O.
To summarize, the regressions we estimate look pretty much like equation (3.2),
with the addition of the variables just mentioned and with the exception of a variable (like26
NOFRAN) that captures political participation. Like in Section 3, the error term in the
regressions also captures unobservable country—specific differences in the rate of return, in
addition to any omitted variables.
4.2 Results
Since the theory does not imply a unique specification, we estimated several alternative
models. The results are reported in Table 4.2. All the icgressions in this table were
estimated by OLS and the number of observations ranges from 53 to 59, depending on
which variables are induded. A plot of the data reveals that a log specification may be
more appropriate for the income inequality variable. In Some regressions—marked by an
asterisk in the table—RATIO is therfore measured in natural logs rather than in natural
numbers.
The results are surprisingly good, given the large variety of countries in the sample.
All the variables have the expected sign, they are significant most of the time, and explain
up to 40% of the variance in growth.'9 In particular, RATIO always has a negative
coefficient, as predicted by our model, which is generally significant at the 5% level. The
effects of inequality on growth are also quantitatively significant. A one standard
deviation increase in inequality decreases growth by just below half a percentage point.
This is almost exactly the same number that we obtained in the historical sample of
Section 3.
As mentioned above, many countries in this sample are ruled by non—democratic
political institutions. In these there may be little relationship between income inequality
in the population at large and the redistributive preferences of the government. For this
reason, we reestimated the model, dropping from the sample the countries that were not
democracies during a significant part of the sample period. The regressions in columns (1)
19 Except for the results on the effects on growth of income inequality, these results are similar to
those in Bano (1991), who does not include income inequality in his empirical study.Table 4.2: Regressions for GROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
#OBS 59 53 59 59 57
CONS TANT—0.041 —0.106 0.620 0.424 0.565
(—0.063) (—3.475) (0.800) (0.567) (0.827)
RATIO —0.141 —0.144 _0.923* —O.807 0.698*
(—1.676) (—1.633) (—2.219) (—2.009) (—1.628)
GDP6O —O.45E—03 —0.40E—03 —0.49E—03 —0.62E—03 —0.71E—03
(—3.148) (—2,398) (—3.401) (—4.199) (—4.345)
PSCHOOL6O 0.048 0.520 0.048 0.037 0.031







0.367 0.369 0.389 0.438 0.438
SEE 1.513 1.553 1.486 1.426 1.363
Note: Ordinary—least—squares regressions; i—values in brackets;
a *meansthat variable is measured in natural logs.27
and (2) of Table 4.3 are based on a subsample, which consists only of those countries that
were democracies for at least 75% of the years between 1960 and 1985. The results are
very similar to those obtained for the full sample (see the results in Table 4.2), except that
the coefficient on income inequality rises in absolute value and becomes strongly
sigmficant. Columns (3) amd (4) report the results when we reestimate the same
regressions for the subsample of non—democratic countries. Now the coefficient on income
inequality instead drops considerably and becomes insignificant. But the coefficients on all
other variables remain unaffected. Similar results are obtained for specifications other than
those reported in the table. The results are also similar if we use a less restrictive criterion
for being in the sample of democratic countries (such as being a democracy for at least 50%
of the period). These results are clearly in line with our model: being a democracy should
make a difference for the effect of income inequality on growth, but not for the other
variables which refer to features of the economy. This different effect of inequality on
growth between democratic and non—democratic countries also indicates that our findings
are not due to reverse causation or to some other non—political mechanism. But more on
this in the next subsection.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We mentioned in Section 4.1 that RATIO is often measured in the middle of the period
1960—85. To remove any simultaneity bias, we reestimated the regressions in Table 4.2 by
two—6tage least squares (2SLS). In all specifications, our instruments for RATIO were:
the percentage of the labor force in the agricultural sector in 1960, the male life expectancy
ratio in 1960, and the independent variables GDPÔO, PSCHOOL6O, and SSCHOOL6O.
We believe these are pretty good instruments. They capture different aspects of the
economic and social structure of a country and are likely to be correlated with income
inequality. On the other hand, since the instruments are all measured in 1960 and most of
them belong to the regressors in the GROWTH—equation, they are unlikely to beTable 4.3: Regressions for GROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
#OBS 37 34 22 22
CONSTANT 0.645 0.644 —4)261 —0.025
(0.624) (0.572) (—0.340) (—0.265)
RATIO —0.273 —0.294 —0.017 —0.055
(—2.450) (—2.402) (—0.136) (—0.409)
GDP6O —0.46E-—03 —0.45E--03 —0.19E-—02 —0.18E--02
(—3.283) (—2.402) (—3.009) (—2.538)
PSCHOOL6O 0.048 0.045 0.062 0.071
(4.721) (3.857) (3.406) (3.372)
IND6O 0.012 —0.026
(0.504) (—0.837)
B2 0.490 0.428 0.353 0.349
SEE 1.394 1.459 1.445 1.496
Note: Ordinary—Ieast—€quares regressions; —va1ues in brackets.28
correlated with the error term of that equation.
The first three columns in Table 4.4 report on the 2SLS—estimates. We see that
the results are very similar to those in Table 4.2, except that the variable RATIO has an
even higher t—statistic. The results are very robust to changing the set of instruments and
to other specifications of the GROWTH—equation. As before, measuring RATIO in logs
improves the fit. The last column in Table 4.4 restimates the regression of column (2) for
the restricted sample of countries that were democracies for at least 75% of the time. Here,
the results do not change. But for the sample of excluded non—democratic countries (not
reported in the table) the estimated coefficient of income inequality drops and becomes
insignificantly different from zero, whereas the other coefficients remain the same. Similar
results are obtained if we redefine this sample as consisting of countries that were
democracies for 50% (as opposed to 75%) of the time.
An examination of the residuals reveals that there are no critical outliers.20
However, the estimated residuals tend to be larger in absolute value for the countries with
lower per capita income in 1960. Performing the White (1980) test, indeed reveals that
heteroskadasticity is present. We therefore reestimated the model, still by 2SLS, but
weighting each observation with GDP6O. The results for two such specifications appear in
columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.4. The results are now even more supportive of the
theoretical model: the t—statistics increase further in absolute value. Other specifications,
not reported in the table, share the same features.
Like in section 3, it is likely that several regressors and particularly RA TIO are
measured with error.Even though the instrumental—variables results suggest that
measurement error in RATIO is not a significant problem, we nevertheless apply the
techniques of Klepper and Learner (1984) to check the robustness of our results. Consider
20 Exceptfor Hongkong and Singapore that have an exceptionally large value for URB65. But
there is no good reason for dropping these two countries and in any event they do not affect the
estimated coefflecient on the variable of most interest, RATIO.Table 4.4: Regressions for GROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# OBS 56 50 50 50 50 34
CONSTANT 2.540 3.421 4.182 5.340 5.164 2.823
(1.393) (2.098) (2.020) (2.257) (2.385) (1.388)
RATIO —0.621 —0.767 —3.050 —0.778 _2.729* —0.667
(—1.936) (—2.195) (—2.626) (—2.751) (—2.789) (—2.200)
GDP6O —0.81E—03 —0.73E—03 —0.66E--03 —0.58E—03 —0.49E—03 —0.63E—03
(—3.460) (—2.486) (—2.937) (—2.891) (—3.298) (—2.706)
PSCHOOL6O 0.041 0.050 0.012 0.026 0.032 0.037
(3.201) (3.450) (4.125) (1.776) (2.597) (2.482)
URB65 0.022 —0.71E—03
(1.383) (—0.050)
IND6O 0.028 —0.007 —0.010 —0.017 0.033
(0.038) (—0.297) (—0.491) (—0.007) (1.053)
0.296 0.225 0.323 0.253 0.336 0.355
SEE 1.842 2.180 1.768 82.989 66.106 1.676
Note: Two—stage—least-—squares regressions; in columns (4) and (5) observations are weighted
with GDP; i—values in brackets; a *meansthat variable is measured in natural logs;
Column (6) refers to countries that were democracies at least 75 % of the period.29
first the most parsimonious specification in Table 4.2 (columns (1) and (3)). Whenwe
regress the equations in all directions, as in Section 3, all the variables retain their signs.
We can therefore conclude that the true maximum—likelihood estimators lie in theconvex
hull of the estimates so obtained. In particular, the coefficient on RATIO lies in the
intervals:
(1) (3)
[—2.908, —0.141] [—11.228, —0.929],
where the number in brackets refer to the columns of Table 4.2. Note that in both cases
the least—squares estimator coincides with the upper bound (algebraically). Thus if
anything, the measurement error tends to bias the coefficient on HA TIO towards zero and
thus against our theory. We obtain similar results for the other specifications in Table 4.2,
provided that we maintain the assumption that only RATIO, PSCHOOL6O, and GDP6O
are measured with error.
For about half the countries in the sample, we have Gl)P—data from 1950. For
these countries, we redefined GROWTH to be the average growth rate over the period
1950—85 and replaced GDP6O with per capita GDP in 1950. For the remaining countries
these variables remained as before. When we pooled all the countries and reestimated the
equations in Tables 4.2 and 4.4, the results were very similar. Again the coefficient on
RATIO was always negative and often significant at the 5% level.
To gain observations, we also added to our sample 12 countries for which RA TIO
is available only for post—tax income. We then interacted RATIO with a dummy that
takes a value of unity for the added countries and zero for the original countries. Again the
results were similar to those reported above, and the interacted dummy was always
insignificantly different from zero.
The results are also robust to slight variations in the sample of countries and to
redefining the measure of income inequality as INCSJ-f in the previous section.
All this sensitivity analysis strongly indicates that our results are not due to30
measurement error, to particular features of the sample, or to reverse causation. We are
left, however, with one possibility. We have already stressed that our sample includes
countries with very different institutions, and despite our attempts to control for these
differences RA TIO may pick up the effect of some omitted variable. Indeed, a careful
examination of the residuals reveals a systematic pattern: the Latin American countries
tend to have negative residuals, while the Asian countries tend to have positive residuals.
So the wide social, political and economic differences between these continents may not be
adequately captured by the variables we have included on the right—hand side of our
regressions.
For this reason, we added three continental dummies—for Asia, Africa and Latin
America—to the previous regressions. Their effect depends on the method of estimation.
In the OLS estimations the dummy variables are generally significant. The coefficient on
RATIO remains negative, but its i—statistic drops to a value close to zero. This is because
our inequality measure is higher in Latin America and lower in Asia, compared to the rest
of the sample. On the other hand, in the 2SLS estimations the results remain supportive of
our hypothesis: even though the t—statistics on RATIO drop relative to Table 4.3, they
remain significant at the 10% level.
5. Discussion
5.1 Main results
Drawing on the theories of endogenous economic growth and endogenous economic policy,
we formulated a model that relates equilibrium growth to income inequality and political
institutions. The main theoretical result is that income inequality is harmful for growth,
because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not allow full private
appropriation of returns from investment. This implication is strongly supported by the31
historical evidence of a narrow cross—section of countries, and by the post—war evidence
from a broad cross—section of countries.
5.2 Possible extensions
This paper may serve as a stepping stone for further theoretical and empirical work along
similar lines. Natural theoretical extensions include: (1) A richer political structure: it
would be desirable to let both young and old vote each period. This would require that the
youngs' behavior were affected by policy in some additional way. (2) A richer policy
problem:it would be interesting to add incentive problems in policy due to lack of
commitment in capital taxation or patent legislation, as well as to allow the government to
spend the tax proceeds in other ways besides lump sum redistribution.2' (3) A richer
savings behavior: suppose that the individual savings rate depend on the individual income
level, so that people with with sufficiently low income do not accumulate any k.This
may change the prediction that income inequality is monotonically related to growth: at
very low levels of development, redistributing income towards the rich may increase
aggregate savings and hence lead to more rapid growth, if the rich have a higher marginal
propensity to save than the poor.22 (4) A richer intertemporal structure: suppose that the
voters' horizon extends beyond two periods (because they are altruistic or because of a
different intergenerational structure). Suppose further that the current policy affects the
future distribution of income, by changing the distribution Ft.)inthe model. Then the
voters would face an interesting intertemporal tradeoff: more redistribution today, by
changing the preferences and possibly the identity of the future political majorities, could
lead to policies more conducive to growth in the future. Thus there would be a tradeoff
between slower growth today in exchange for more rapid growth in the future. This
21 Alesina and Rodrik (1990) study how a social planner with redistributive objectives chooses
among redistribution and public investment in a model related to ours.
22 Perotti (1990) addresses this question in a model with three different kinds of agents who vote on
tax policy.32
extension would be technically demanding. But it would enable one to tackle the difficult
normative questions raised at the end of Section 2.4, about how to induce a growth take off
and how to design beneficial political institutions.
Finally, the natural extensions of the empirical analysis include: (5) Allowing for
population growth; this would be straightforward in the theoretical part, but it could lead
to different empirical predictions. (6) Adding more countries, particularly in the historical
sample. While we think we have exhausted the available data for Europe and the US, it
may be feasible to add Canada, Australia and Japan to our historical sample.(7)
Attempting to discriminate between our hypothesis, that income inequality affects growth
through a political mechanism, with other competing hypotheses. We believe that our
statistical evidence is robust, in the sense that the causality runs from inequality to growth
and that our results are not due to reverse causation. But there may be other purely
economic reasons why inequality is harmful for growth.23
23 Alternative,purely economic, reasons for why inequality might be harmful for growth have been
analyzed in Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer (1989)—who look at the composition of demand—and Galor
and Zeira (1990)—who look at imperfect credit markets. In the ambitious model of Greenwood and
Jovanovich (1990) income distribution and growth become correlated over time due to financial
development.33
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Appendix
A.1 Going from the model to te8table hypotheses
Given the definition of GDP in the text, the gross growth rate of GDP is
(A.1) 1 + =
(u7+ f)k/(w+ rt1)k1.
To get an approximation of the net growth ratefirst take logs in (A.1) to get
(A.2) =(w/(w+ f))lw —(wt1/(w1 + ri))lnw1
+ (r/(w + —
(rt-_i/(wt_1+ ft 1)1nr1 +
Then make a first—order approximation of (2.11) to get:
(A.3)t =(s,, +G00)wt 1 + (C+G0O)rt+GOOE(Ekkt 1 + +
Now, given the assumptions in (2.13), we can use (A.2) and (A.3) to derive
(A.4) =+ + aEt(Ekkt 1 Etl + Eeti) +
where
aot= (.t—iI(wt—1 + rt1)'(G+ G00)exp(ln)
= +r + a90)
°Et= (r_11(w_i +
GOOE
=(—i/(+ + + (r/(w + —
+ + [(r/(w + r)) — (rt_i/(W_1 + Tt_i)]eXpn )
+(G+G0O)exp(i) -- [(w/(w+ —(vit 1/(w1 -- r1))}lnw.
If we ignore the (unobservable) time variation in the coefficients and in the variance structure of the
error term in (A.4) we obtain equation (2.14)
A.2 Sources for the historical data set
RTGROWTH: Average rate of growth of real GDP over 20—year periods, continuously compounded.
Sources: Maddison (1982) for the period 1830—1950 and Summers and Heston for the period 1950—85.
GDP: Level of GDP per capita in the first year of each 20—year period. Sources: Maddison (1982) for
the period 1830—1950 and Summers and Hestort for the period 1950—85. The 1950—indexescomputed
from Maddison were spliced with the l950—yalues from Summers and Heston toget compatible series.
INCSII: Share of pre—tax income received by the top 20% of the population. Computed from tax
statistics and sometimes adjusted for incomplete coverage on the basis of census data. We only used
sources with a wide original coverage, however. The income units and income concepts may vary across
countries due to different tax laws. All observations except a few are close (5years or less) from the
beginning of the relevant 2O—year period. 5ource, For UK 1870, 1890, 1910, Lindert and Williamson
(1985); for the Netherlands 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970, Hartog and Veenbergen (1978), for the US 1930,
1950, Department of Commerce (1975); US 1970, Jam (1975); for all other observations, Flora, Kraus and
Pfennig (1987, Ch. 6)37
NOFRAN: Share of the enfranchised sex and age group not in the electorate at the year of the election
closest to the beginning of the relevant time period. Computed from data on electoral rules and from
censuses. Sources: for the US (presidential elections), Mackit and Rose (1982) and Department of
Commerce (1975); for all other countries (parlamentiary elections) Flora (1983, Ch. 3)
SCHOOL: Index of education computed as
0.1PSCHOOL + 0.2LSSCHOOL + 0.3HSSCHOOL + 0.4UNIV,
where each component of the index and their sources are described below.
PSCHOOL: Share of 5—14 age group enrolled in primary school. Computed from detailed data on
different types of schools and population data from censuses.Sources: for the US, Department of
Commerce (1975), for all other countries Flora (1983, Ch. 10)
LSSCHOOL: Share of 10—14 age group enrolled in post—primary school and lower secondary school.
Computed from detailed data on different types of schools and population data from censuses. Sources:
for the US, Department of Commerce (1975), for all other countries Flora (1983, Ch. 10)
HSSCHOOL: Share of 15—19 age group enrolled in higher secondary school. Computed from detailed
data on different types of schools and population data from censuses. Source,: for the US, Department
of Commerce (1975), for all other countries Flora (1983, Ch. 10)
UNIV: Share of 20—24 age group in universities and institutes for higher education. Computed from
detailed data on different types of schools and population data from censuses. Sources: for the US,
Department of Commerce (1975), for all other countries Flora (1983, Ch. 10)
A.3 Sources for the current data set
GROWTH: Average rate of growth in real GDP per capita over 1960—85, continuously compounded.
Source: Summers and Heston (1988)
GDP6& Real GDP per capita in 1960, expressed in "international V. Source: Summers and Heston
(1988)
PSCHOOL6 Percentage enrolled in primary school out of relevant age group in 1960. Source: World
Bank (1984).
SSCHOOL6Ot Percentage enrolled in secondary school out of relevant age group in 1960.Source:
World Bank (1984).
URB65: Urban population as a percentage of total population in 1965. Source: World Bank (1984).
IND6O. Percentage of GDP originating in the industrial sector in 1960. Source: World Bank (1984).
RATIO: Ratio of pre—tax income received by the richest 20% of the population to the pre—tax income
received by the poorest 40% of the population. It is computed from several sources: UN (1981), UN
(1985), Jodice and Taylor (1983), Jam (1975) and World Bank (1987). This ratio generallyrefers to
different years for different countries. Most often it refers to households, but sometimes to individuals.
Also, in some cases it was not reported whether it refers to income before or after tax.
In the instrumental—variables regressions we also used the following variables taken fromWorld
Bank (1984): Male life expectancy ratio in 1960, Percentage of labor force in the agricultural sector in
1960.</ref_section>